Francesca Righetti
Francesca Righetti
francesca.righetti.philo[at]gmail.com
francesca.righetti.philo[at]gmail.com
Publications
Refereed Journal Articles
Fayyaz, Z., Righetti, F., Wiskott, L., & Werning, M. Remembering without (representational) memory: a neuro-computational study on regaining categoricity and compositionality from minimal traces. Philosophical Psychology, 1–36.
This paper provides a proof of principle for the philosophical theory of Trace Minimalism, a novel account of episodic memory. It claims that remembering goes without the storage of representational content in memory. Remembering rather consists in the construction of a representation of a scenario, previously experienced, through the interaction of minimal traces with acquired statistical regularities. A minimal trace merely constitutes a causal link to the experience but possesses no trans-temporally transmitted representational (viz. categorical and compositional) content. Our proof of principle uses a neuro-computational model that is based on an autoencoder modeling the visual pathway and a transformer modeling the semantic information network. It assumes the hippocampus as the host of minimal traces. Our model demonstrates that minimal traces, which lack sufficient information for reliable categorization and composition of content on their own, can be enhanced through interaction with semantic information. This process allows for the accurate construction of past scenarios, respecting regularities in the world and supporting the reliability of episodic memory. Our findings suggest that episodic memory relies on sparse, fragmentary information rather than stored content, providing a robust proof of principle that remembering is possible without representational memory traces.
Righetti, F. Re-enactment and embodied resonance in episodic memory: reconciling phenomenological approaches and constructive theories. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
This paper investigates the embodied dimensions of episodic memory through a phenomenological analysis. Contemporary philosophical theories understand episodic memory as a mental representation of a past event ‘happening in the head’. A philosophical account that seemingly supports an embodied understanding of episodic memory comes from phenomenology. Phenomenology has traditionally understood episodic memory in terms of presentification, which implies a reproduction of the elapsed portion of the consciousness lived during the foreground experience, replicating the previous perceptual activity. However, this appears to be incoherent with the constructive theories of episodic memory, which highlight how subjects shift perspectives in memory or include information not present in the foregoing experience. Thus, according to these contemporary theories, episodic memory is unlikely to imply a replay of the past conscious experience. I argue that if we investigate the embodied dimensions, then it is possible to reconcile the phenomenological approach and the constructive theories. More precisely, I ground the investigation on the analysis of operative intentionality and its role in comparing procedural and episodic memory. I argue that two embodied features qualify the reproductive modification of consciousness: the flexible re-enactment of the previous operative intentionality and the pre-reflective mode of embodied resonance with an agent I am no longer.
Righetti, F. The pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory: a phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22, 479–499.
This paper investigates the madeleine-memory (so-called from Proust's novel In Search of Lost Time) as a case of pre-reflective experience, from the genesis of its sedimentation into the body. Indeed, I aim to address the question of the literary protagonist Marcel on the roots of his happiness and the genesis of his memories. Until now, the madeleine-memory has been described as bodily and involuntary. In phenomenology, a wide literature has confirmed the relationship between the sense of body ownership and pre-reflective self-awareness. I aim to build upon such a mutual link and show that the pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory have to be traced back to the genesis of the involuntary recollections. To this purpose, I will illustrate that the epistemological relationship between the object and the subject plays a relevant role in the way the subject remembers. First, I will present that madeleine-memory is a unique case of bodily memory, by analyzing the main features that characterize it. Secondly, I will analyze the original experience of the madeleine within the phenomenological logic of transcendence in immanence. For this aim, I will rely on the Husserlian notions of “epistemological inadequacy of perception” and “background experiences”. Through these notions, I will show that Proustian involuntary recollections are pre-reflective experiences because previously subjects have pre-reflectively experienced the content of recollections.
2025
2024
2023
Proceedings
Righetti, F., Fayyaz, Z., Wiskott, L., Werning, M. From Minimal Traces to Scenarios of the Past: A Neuro-Computational Model on Regaining Categoricity and Compositionality in Remembering. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.
This paper presents a proof of principle for Trace Minimalism (Werning, 2020), a novel philosophical framework for episodic memory. Trace Minimalism claims that remembering does not involve the storage of representational content but rather the reconstruction of past scenarios through the interaction of minimal traces with semantic information. Minimal traces establish a causal link to prior experiences but lack categorical and compositional content. We provide a neuro-computational model using a vector-quantized autoencoder and a transformer-based semantic completion mechanism. Our findings support the hypothesis that remembering is possible without representational memory traces and that minimal traces, in interaction with semantic information, reliably construct past scenarios. The results offer a compelling alternative to classical representational theories of memory while maintaining causal continuity with past experiences.
2025
Commentary Article
Righetti, F. A metaphysics of processes for the sciences and philosophy of memory. Giornale italiano di psicologia, 52. (Commentary on Ianì, F. (2025). ”What metaphysics for psychology? From substances to processes”) in Italian.
Francesco Ianì’s “Quale metafisica per la psicologia? Dalle sostanze ai processi” (2025) argues for replacing a metaphysics of substances with a metaphysics of processes in psychology. This commentary examines whether such a shift can genuinely advance the philosophy and science of memory. While Ianì’s process-oriented framework promises a more dynamic and integrated view of cognition - aligned with theories of complex systems and 4E cognition - it also risks undermining conceptual stability in cognitive science. Focusing on episodic memory as a test case, this paper questions whether rejecting substance metaphysics entails abandoning the notion of memory as a natural kind. If so, the process view might lead to eliminativist consequences, dissolving the category of episodic memory itself. Ultimately, the paper contends that substance metaphysics, despite its limitations, remains necessary for maintaining coherent conceptual structures within the empirical study of memory.
2025
Book Reviews
Righetti, F., Review of Gregory, D. & Michaelian, K., Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues, Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2024, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
This review examines Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues, a collection exploring the intricate relationship between two central yet elusive cognitive phenomena. The volume’s guiding premise - “nothing can be understood in isolation” - frames an integrative investigation into how dreaming and memory illuminate one another. Divided into three sections - Remembering Dreams, Remembering Within Dreams, and Remembering and Dreaming Compared - the book invites reflection on whether dreams can be remembered, whether dreams are forms of memory, and what similarities between the two. The review highlights how this interdisciplinary dialogue challenges traditional boundaries between memory and dreaming cognition, while emphasizing its relevance for the phenomenological investigation and debate. The review aims to orient phenomenological readers within this debate and encourage deeper engagement with its conceptual and experiential stakes.
2025
Righetti, F., Stephano Micali: Tra L'altro e Se Stessi, Phenomenological Reviews. in Italian.
Stefano Micali’s Tra l’altro e se stessi investigates the relationship between singular identity and alterity through diverse themes framed within phenomenological studies. The work explores both the dialectic of self and other, and the alterity inherent in subjectivity, often emerging unexpectedly in encounters with others. Departing from conventional expectations of phenomenological inquiries into intersubjectivity, the book traverses an eclectic range of topics, including comparisons between Kant and Ginzburg, analyses of subjectivity via concepts like stupidity and common sense, and an exploration of prayer as a relational act. The essays, reworked from earlier publications, offer a multidimensional lens on the complexities of identity and otherness. Divided into three parts, the book begins with a methodological examination of phenomenology. The second, central section addresses the genesis of subjectivity and its encounters with otherness. The final part examines critical issues through negative phenomena, such as depression and prayer, to illuminate the subject-other dynamic. This review aims to identify the thematic continuity across the chapters and highlights the originality and depth of Micali’s contribution to phenomenology.
2022